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PREFACE.

The College Fraternity is but one of the large
class of organizations whose legal status is not very clearly
defined.

Social clubs and other kindred societies abound

in our cities and villages and exist for the nere pleasure of
their members and for, no other purpose.

They are seldom

of sufficient importanc, to bring the legal questionsto which
they give birth into the higher courts, and we cant therefore
find but few reported decisions to enlighten us upon the
rules of law which govern this class of organizations.

In

England however, the position of these societies and their
internal and external relations have been the subjects of
considerable litigation, and hence over there the law has become more settled.

The few decisions which the American

reports supply are in nearly all oases based upon the English
law, and I have not hesitated to cite English authorities
when unable to find any American cases directly in point.
The title of this thesis may hot be a very good index of
its contents, but it should be borne in mind that the College

-2Fraternity is but one of the large class and there are no
rules of law peculiar to itself.

The majority of these so-

cieties are not incorporated and the greater portion of this
work is devoted to the discussion of the principles of law
applicale to unincorporated societies which ere usually
termed in the books "Voluntary Associations".

However,

many fraternity chapters have ,con incorporated, as every
well organized chapter ought to be, and I have endeavored in
the last chapter to outline the procedure incident to incorporation under the "Social Club" statute in New York State.
The form given in the appendix is one which has already stood
the test.
Addison C. Ormsbcc.
Cornell University
gist. of "ay, 1894.
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THE LEGAL STATUS CF TVE UNINCC PCRATED FRATERNITY.

The college fraternity belomgs to a class of organizations which occupies a somewhat anomalous position in
the law.

They bear resemblance to both the Corporation and
It is

the partnership, yet are not identical with either.

because of their resemblance to these two great classes of
combinations of individuals that conisiderable confusion exists
among the cases many of which seem to have boon decided upon
the principle that every such combination must be either a
corporation or a partnership, if it is not the one it must
of necessity be the other.

But a fraternal society is not

a corporation unless by virtue of statute law.
no grant from the sovereign power.

There is

The society has n--

existance apart from the individuals who compose it.

It re-

sembles a corporation in that it may provide a constitution
and by-laws regulating admission and expulsion of members etc.
and in that the members may be constantly changing, but a

-2member of' such a society does not possess the transferable
interest which is incidental to membeOrsip in a corporation.
Neither is such a society a partnership.

A partnership

as defined by Lindley is"The contract relation subsisting between persons who have combined their property, labor, or
skill in an enterprise or business, as principals for pecuniary profit".

Pecuniary profit is the essential object of

a partnership.

Whatever definition may be considered the

correct one, they all embody the idea that a partnership must
exist for a business purpose and for that alone.
manifestly not the object of a fraternal society.

This is

-3CHAPTIR II.
-0-

WHAT IS L21- i'RSIP ?

Membership in

.

society arises out of contract.

This contract consists of' the written and unwritten laws of
the society.

The most important evidence of this contract

are the constitution and by-laws of the society, if it has
any.

One of the essentials of a binding contract is mutu-

ality, the consent of a party to be bound.

It is therefore

obvious that in order that a person may be bound by the articles in a constitution he must have either expressly or by
implication consented to assume the duties and responsibilities arising from the contract of which these articles are
evidence, expressly by placing his signature beneath the constitution or by a declaration to the effect that he assumes
such duties and responsibilities, impliedly by ohtering into
the full rights and privileges of membership in such scciety
with knowledge of the existance of its constitution.
The constitution and by-laws of a society will determine

-4the effect of the contractual relation so far as they can be
The courts have fully recognized their supremacy

applied.

when questions involving their binding force have come up
for decision and they will be enforced as between the parties
tc the c ntract, no matter whether they are reasonable or
not, so long as there is nothing illegal or U.
about thema.

ionable

The principle vfhich obtains generally both in

England and in the United States is clearly stated in the
opinion in a Pennsylvania case, (Leach v. Harris, 2 Brewsters,
571, ) as follows, "where an association is organized not in
pursuance of any statute and the terms of membership are not
fixed by the Common Law, the agreement which the members make
among themselves on the subject must establish and determine
the rights of the partie.s.

The constitution of an associa-

tion and its terms agreed upon form the law which should
govern.

The members have established a law themselves."

But the articles of association must not be unconscionable or contrary to the law4r of the land,.
tion of such a defect is
i34)

found in

(State v.

A good illustraWilliams,

75 N.C.

vhcre the constitution of a society called the Good

-5-

Samaritans provided for cortain cercmonies which should attend
the expulsion of an offending member and which consisted in
tying a rope about the waist of the of'fondor and suspending
him in mid air.

The court hold that such a provision was in

violation of the law of the land, and that an attempt to enforce it would constitute a battery for which those who partici

pated could be held criminally liablo.
Ordinarily the courts are reluctant to entertain quest-

ions involving voluntary associations and if they entertain
them at all are disposed to give them a liberal construction;
this though

±s

altered and the courts will enforce a strict

conformity to the articles of association against any members
who may attempt to use force or violance in connection with
association management.
Irving v. Forbs,

11 Barb., 587.

Ugnst v. Shortz, F Whart.,
Runkel v.

Winemuller,

4 H. &

506.
KIcH.,(Nd. ) 429.

-6CHAPTER IIl.
--
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POWER OF TIMM 11AJORITY

An interesting question arises as to how far a majority of the members of a society may act so as to bind the
Ordinarily the act of a majority at a meeting of

minority.

which due notice has been given and at which a quorum is present, supposing that the proceedings have been conducted with
due regard to correct parliamentary proceedure, will be binding upon the minority, and those members who

are presentAare

by a parliamentary fiction deemed to be on the side of the
majority.

We assume however, that the proceedings have

been regular and that questions have been put before the sosiety by the person upon whom this duty devolves.

A quest-

ion put Atnofficially cannot bind the mem.bars who do not vote
and who,

if

the question had been properly put,

been regarded as a part of the majority.
strated in the case of (Com. v.

would have

This was demon-

Green, 4 Whart.,

604).

In

this case a certain faction of a society, upon the refusal of

-7-

an

eal from the decision of the presidin7 officer, through

one of their adherents made a motion to degrade him, which
they asserted was carried by their actual votes
structive votes of those who refused Io vote.

nd the conThe court

said in the opinion,"To all questions put by the established
orga-1 it

is

the duty of every member tC respond or Ibe counted

with the greater number because he is supposed to have assented beforehand to the process pro-established to ascertain
the general will, but the rule of implies. asse.-t is certainly
inapplicable to a measure which when justifiable even by extreme necessity is essentially revolutionary and based on no
pre-established process of ascertaimicnt whatever.

To aplly

it to an extreme case of inorganic action ac was done here
might work the degradation of any presiding officer in our
legislative halls by the motion and actual vote of a single
mm'

sustained by the co.structive votes of all the rest."
The ;ower of the majority may be limited or qualified by

the constitution or by-laws and these will be binding whether
reazonablo or not, and subsequent additio,s or amendments to
them will lihewise b- binding if :v ssed according to methods

ri

prescribed in the original articles.
Kohlenbeck v. Logeman, 10 Daly, 447.
The cases in which the question has been passed upon
indicatc that it lies wivthin the power of the majority to
alter or abrogate the original articles of agreement without
restriction so long as property rights al
thereby.

not violated

Thus in the case of (smith v. ielson, 18 Vt.,

550)

where the right of the majority of the members of a ciurch
congregation to renounce the constitution of the denomination
to which they belonged was in question.

The court in its

opinion states the principle as follows, "And of these voluntary associations, though they frequently make constitutions and 'pass by-laws which they C-oclare are hot to be altered, except in a certain way or manner, nevertheless, these
may at any time be altered or abrogated ky the same power
which created them and the vote of any subsequent meeting
abrogating or altering such constitution or by-laws, though
passed only by a majority, hao7 as much efficiency as a previous vote establishing them".
The above doctrine must be taken subject to this qualil-

-9-

fication, that where property rights are involved the courts
will not allom

the majority to unjustly impir them against

the will of the owners.

See on this point.

Livingston v. Lynch, 5 Johnson's Ch.,
Austin v. Searing, 16 N.Y.,

123.

573.

-10CHAPTER IV.

ADMISSIOC - TO 1J124BERSHIP.

Although a contract relation exists between a member
and his society after he has Ybecome a member,

there is

no

such relation between the society and the public through
which a person( regardless of how well qualified he may be)
can compel the society to admit him to membership.
This proposition seems too reasonable to require the
stamp of judicial authority, nevertheless two late cases illustrate the result of a-ttempts to 7ain admission into societies through the courts. In (IMayer v. Journeymen Stone
Cutters Association, 47 N.J.Equity, 519) the vice chancellor
expressed the logic of the situation in the following well
chosen words.

'

These organizations are formed for purposes

mutually agreed upon.

Their right to make by-L,,,,.

s and rules

for the adrnission of members and the transaction of business
is unquestionable.

They may require such qualifications for

membership and such formalities of election as they choose.

-l1They may restrict membership to thi

ori~incl proToters or

limit the nnfber to be thereafter admitted.

The very idea

of such organizations is associations mutually acceptable; or
in accordanot, with regulations agreed upon; a power to require
the admission of any person in any nay objectionable to the
society is ropug-na-It to the scheme of its organizations.---Courts exist to protect rights and when the right has once
attached they will interfere to prevent its violation, but,no
person has any abstract right to such membership;

that depends

upon the action of the society exercised in accordance with
its regulationsand until so admitted no right exists which
the courts cail be called upon to protect or enforce."
(McKano v. Adams,
case on this point.

2

G.,60)is a very interesting ca

The plaintiff, John Y.McKane, sought

to compell the democratic general Lcontittce of Kings County
to admit hi

to membership therein on the ground that he had

been elected a delegate to such com.ittee and was therefore
entitled to become a member of that committee -ut that by a
majority vote it had refused to recognize him as such a del-

egate.

In the course. of his opinion, Judge Grey says,

-12ri-ht to bo a -ember

is not conferred by any statute; nor is

it derivable as in the ca-me of a corporate body.

It is by

reason of the action and of the assent of nembers of a voluntary association that it becomes associated with them in the
common undertaking and not by any outside agency or by the
individuals action.
accorded

iLembership is

a -privilege whi-h may be

or withheld and not a right which can be -ainod in-

dependently and then enforced.------- Ve cannot compare this
case to that of other voluntary associations nor to a co-partnership, to which an unincorporated association is .ometimes
likened, when considering the rights of associates in the
property of the association and the methods for their improvement. "

CHAPTER V.
-- 0-EXPULSICN.
The rules pertaining to (;xpulsion although not of
practical importance in

connection- with the college fraterni-

ty y-t form so large a '-art of the law relatine to voluntary
associations

in

7eneral that an outline of this branch of the

subject may not be inconsistent with the general nature of
this work.

At the outset we should note a distinction be-

tween incorporated societies and those not incorporated.
the former,

In

a memb;er has rights granted by the legislature

which can not be taken away by the society unless authorized
by the governing statute or'charter.

In the latter , a

member has no rights of a higher dignity than those springing
out of a voluntary contract bet!()en himself and his fellow
members.

Such contracts arc, as we hove seen, upheld when

not contrary to law and a rerier may thereby voluntarily
subject himself to summary expulsion for causes and in modes
which would not be justifiable

in

the case of (- corporation

existing under a charter or act of the legislature.

-14Beach in hi: work on corrorations makes the following
" As may be inferred from the General constitution

statement,
of clubs,

in

se;ct

tho

power of' expulsion inherent in
v Bower forms no

xp;.css rule there is

of Eny

no

the mer)eCrs of C club~for such

;:rt of the written contract by iihich the

rTembers are bound,

and therefore even an otherwise unanimous

vote of the club could not expel a nerfIer who refused to
resign".

I.

Vol.

(Beach on Corpor;tions,

p.

iCO)

Perhaps

we do not c,:tch Mr.Beach's meaning , but if he intends to
assert that a voluntary association of individuals possesses
no inherent power of' expulsion if'
are silent on the subject,

its

constitution or by-laws

we, believe tc statement to be

contrary to the underlying principles of association of individuals and to the weight of authority.

It

was a power of a

corporation at Common Law /regardless of charter or by-lawsto
expel a member who had been guilty of an infamous act or who
had committed offenses in violation of his duty as an incorporator.

And if' under the Ccraon Law the corporation poss-

essed this inherent

sower,

why

hould not clubs or societies

in which the very fundamental basis of organization is the

-15compatibil-.ty of' its

members and in

erty or of state onfranchisv_(-cnt

which quustiono of prop-

do not arise have at least
I,% believe this

the same privilege as the corporation.

power to be more extensive in voluntary associations then in
corporations.
130

In

the English case of

C >igby

v.Conol,

) the learned judge states the principle which is

ed by the weight of authority as follows,

"

42 L.T.
support-

There is no jur-

isdiction that I am aware of reposed, in this country at
least, in any of the Queen's courts to decide upon the rights
of persons to associate with each other when the asscciation
possesses no property.

Persons,

and rniany porzozs do assc-

ciato without any property in cor.on at all.

A do7en1 people

may agree to meet and play xhist at each others houses for a
certaih period and if

olyve

the twelfth any lcnger.

of them refuse to associate with

I am --ot aw.are that there is

zi-y

jurisdiction in any court of justice in this country t6 interfere."
Of course whenever property rights were involved, the
Cormion Law imposed limitations on this power of expulsion and
even when there were no property rights it required -ocd

-10faith and honest action according to principles of natural
justice,

but t

and not i-nto
..

is

ring;

merely curtailing the power of expulsion

is

v

it.

Granting therefore that a society possesses the inherent

power of expulsion , iwe must take into consido ation the
limits imposed upon this power by the contractual telation
subsisting among the Perfoers, and we may down as a general
preliminary proposition that when the Constitution or by-laws
of a society specify the grounds upon which a member may be
expelled or,,place it within the discretion of dertain members
to determine the ground's of expulsion, a person becoming a
member of such an organization and either expressly or by implication consenting to be bound by such constitution and
by-laws is bound by them no matter how unreasonable may be
the provisions in regard to expulsion

,

and the fact that the

society has property merely for society purposes does not
give the member such a pecuniary or property right as will
justify the interference of the court to prevent his expulsion so long as the requirements of the law in respect to all
associations are followed.

This is ettled law both in England

-17and in'the United States.
In taking up the specific questions arising under expulsion, we observe, first, that the power to expel a member
from a society exists only in the society at largc unless the
articles of association vest this power in a smaller number
as in the board of directors, the trustees, or the managing
comittee.

'e

No decisions have been found directly in point

on this proposition but it is supported by considerable dicta.
In

(Innes v.

Wylie,

1 Car.& K.

262),

a member was expelled

by a majority vote from a society whose by-laws wore silent
on 'the subject of expulsion.

The court held the expulsion

unlawful because opportunity had n. t been given to the member
to defend himself before the meeting at which his expulsion
Was considered , but it said through Denman,C.J.,

"I an of

the opinion that when there is not any property in which all
the members of a society have a joint interest the majority
may by resolutions remove any one member. "
been cited approvingly in

(Thite v.

Brownell,

This dictum has
4 Abb.(N.S)

162)

the leading American case on the general subject of voluntary
associations.

.

-18The constitution or by-laws of
vide in

society -enerally pro-

what body the nowcr of expulsion is

in a comnitte
Lbard is

-.

or board of directors.

lod-ed, usually

This comrittee or

sometirmes given exclusive jurisdiction but usually

an appeal is allowed to the society at large.
that nc coimmittee,

board cf directors,

it is obvious

or trustees have avny

jurisdiction to expel members unless

VOWer
PuOh bc expressly

conferred by the articles of' association.

The function of

such bodies is to conduct the business of the a-sociation
and not to determine natters concerninrg its constituent character.
Secondly, the judicatory in a society has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what conduct in a member will justify
his expulsion but it must not transcend the limits imposed by
the articles

;f association.

The exercise of this discretion

in good faith and within the required limits will not be
questioned in

a court of equity.
Lyttleton v.
White v.

Blackbur,

Trov'mell,

33 L.T.,

4 Abb.(N..3)

641.
162.

Thirdly, the law imposes the following duties upon such

-10judicatory; That it will act in good faith and without malice;
that due notice shall be

given to the accused ncnLer of

the

time and place where his case is to be considCred and that he
shall be allowed an opportunity to be heard and to give evidence in his defense;

and that all proceedings shall be

regular and conducted according to principles of natural
justice.
These last propositions are .:ettleod lfaw in England and t
the E h-lish cases deciding them have teen approved and fol
lowed in this country.

The leading English cases supporting

these propositions are,
Hopkinson v. liar uis of Exeter, 17 L.T.,

368.

Gardner v. Freonantle, 24 L.T., 65.
Dawkins v. Atrotius,

44 L.T.,

557.

Fisher v. Kean,

41 L.T.,

335.

In the latter case the court says,

"

The conmittee are

bound to act according to ordinary principles of justice, and
are not to convict a mran of a grave offense which shall warrant his expulsion from the club without fair, adequate, and
sufficient notice and an opportunity of meeting the accusa-

-20tions brought a'-ainst him.
it

They ought not as I understand

according to the ordinary rules by which justice shouldbe

administered by committees of clubs or by any other body of
persons who decide upon the conduct of others, to blast a man's
reputation forever, perhaps to ruin his prosnects for life,
without giving him an opportunity of either def(;nding or palliating his conduct, and when such notice has not been given
the court will interfere by injunction restraining the committee from carrying out their resolution to expel the member'
The English doctrine is appoved and followed in,
White v.

Bro. nll,

Hutchinson v.

4 Abb.(N.S. ) 102.

Lawrencr,

37 How. Pr.,

381.

Fourthly, when the article-s of association specify the
grounds of oxnulsion and the proceedure with rega.rd to time
of notice and etc.,

they must be strictly

followed by the

judicatcry.
This proposition is in harmony with the general rules of
law relating to procedure in cases where personal rights are
involved, and if the articles of association specify a certain
time when notice shall be given of a meeting in which the

-2lexpulsion of a member is to be authorizvd and decided upon,
a variation from this provision will give sufficient ground
to a member who should. be expelled at

meeting to call
nis

upon the courts of equity.
Thus in C Labouchere v. Earl of Wharncliff,

)

where the rules of a sccLoty required that a notice of such
meeting should be posted fourteen days in advance and notice
was posted on the first of November, for a trial to be had on
the fourteenth.

The .em-ber who was expelled from the soci-

ety as a result of this meeting, a-aled to the court on the
ground of insufficient notice and the court held that the
notic, was not sufficient to support the sentence of expulsion
Fifthly, a member must first exhaust his remedies within
the society before the courts will entertain his case.

Thus

if an appeal is given from the judicatory which has passed
the sentence of suspension or expulsion either to a higher
judicatory or to the society at large, the complaining member
cannot call upon a Court of Equity for redress until he has
prosecuted. the a-peal within the society unless by evasions,
intentional delays, or other unjust proc.,dure he is deprived

-22of any further renedy given him bLy the constitution or by-laws
of the society.
no a -clate

But where the laws of a society provide for

tribunal within the society the r-,ember may appeal

directly to the judicial dourts.
White v.

Brownell,

4 Abb.

) 1C2,199.

(N.S.

Lafond v. Deems,

31 '. Y.,

507.

Loubat v. Leroy,

40 Hun,

546.

The usual relief where members of unincorporated clubs
or other societies are unlawfully expelled is
ion in

a court of' Equity.

by au injunct-

Authority has been found in

an

English case for the proposition that no action for d hmages
will lie

against the committee

unlawvful expulsion.

of a society which docrees an

A genius for refinement has discovered

a reason for this conclusion in that the act of expulsion
being void, the plaintiff¢ has sustained nb injury since not-iithstanding.the expulsion he is still a member. ( Wood v.
Wood, 9lExch., 190).

If

this holding be accepted as the law

it results that the expelled member must either resort to the
remedy of injunction or else he must attempt to assert his
rights in the scciety by force and if he 1, forcibly

ejected,

In (Innes v. Vylie, 1
bring an action f'or the assault.
Car.& K., 257 ), the expelled nener took the latter
cou-rse
and endeavored to enter the societies' room but was kept out
by a polic11':o.

Mc therefore brought an action again.t the

defendants who had stationed the policeman thorr for the purpose,

and recovered a verdict which Lord Dennma

refused to

set aside.
It

is

believed however that decisions may be found which

support actions for damages by the expelled member without
his previously resorting to force to assert his rights.
See ( Ludowishi v. Benevolent Society, 20 1.o.

App., 337).

-24CHAPTER VI.
-- 0--

LIABILITY OF MEMBERS FOR SOCIETY DEBTS

Thts branch of our subject is perhaps of the most
practical importance to members of a college fraternity.
Much uncertainty howevor exists in the law of the individual
liability of the members of a voluntary association, particularly if it has no pecuniary gain for its object, and it is
difficult to frame any rules to cover this branch of our subject which we can state positivcly to be the lawr.

We assume

at the outset that the society is unincorporated , for in the
case of an incorporated society different considerations
apply.

Much also depen.l. upon the jurisdiction , for courts

in different jurisdictions differ in their views of the nature and basis of this libility.

A discuszion of the

specific cases which have arisen in the different jurisdictions is beyond the limits of tnis work which permit only a
general survey of the subject.
The earlier decisions indicate the prevalence of the

-25alluded that every

idea to which *ya, A.ave heretofore

erroneous

association of individuals must be either a corpoartion or a
partnership, and hence when the association

a charter

or legislative grant, it was treated as a partnership and its
members were held liable as partners for debts of the association.

Subsequently the courts began to treat these orga-

nizations,

in respect to their internal management,

more like

the corporation , but in their dealings with outside parties
they were still treated as partnerships.

Finally a distinct@

ion was riade between volumtary associations v.which have pecuniary benefit for their cbrject such ss rutual benefit societies etc.,

and those societies which exist solely for the

pleasure of their members, of which the college fraternity is
a prominent illustration.

As to the former class the partner-

ship liability is to some extent retained, but, as to the
latter, it has been held in the more progressive jurisdictions
that no liability attachez to a member by virtue of his membership, and that it can only arise through the principles of
agency.

The courts take this position in Massachusetts,

Oonnecticut, New York, Pennsylvania and probably in other

jurisdictions.
Volger v. Ray,

13_1 Mass.,

439.

Ash v. Guie ,

97 Pa.St., 493.

Davidson v.

55 Conn.,

McCa'be v.

Hold,ln,

Goodfellow,173 N.Y.,

10U.
8.

This doctrine was introduced in New York in tre case of
McCabe v, Goodfollow, which overruled the previously existing
doctrine in that State as laid down in(Park v. spaulding,

10

Hun, 128), a case in which the moebrs were held liable as
partners.

The court in McCabe v. Goodfellow pointed out the

distinction above mentioned and held that in societies formed
for moral, benevolent, social, or political purposes , the
individual liability of the members for contracts made by the
association or its officers or corrmittces depends upon the
application of the principles of the law of agency and authority to create such liability will not be presumed or implied from the existance of a -eneral power to attend to or
transact the business or promote the object for which the
society was formed except where the debt contracted is necessary for its preservation.

-27If

the above doctrine be accepted as the correct
, society is

follows that no individual merber c1

one it

liable for

goods supplied to the society or for debts otherwise incurred
by it if he has not in some way -ledged his -ersonal credit.
This he may do imnediately by his own contracts, orders, or
representations, or fediately through other persons acting
as agents.

The degree of authorization which will suffice

to fix liability on an individual membcr of a society remains
an open question at present.

In older cases dealing with

the pledging of personal credit some action of a distinct
and conscious character was held necessary on the part of the
individual sought to be charged .

But as the law now appears

to stand it is of no legal significance that the defendants
did not intend to be individually responsible, or that they
did not lnow or believe that as a matter of law they would be.
Personal liability is incurred if there has been an "authorization" eithvY

actual or constructive,

involving in

liability

even a person who had no intention of pledgin- his personal
credit and who had but the slightest knowledgi
saction.

of the tran-

-)I-

In

this connection it

is irnportaat to bear in mind the

distinction between general and s:ecial agents,
ties

hen liabili-

have been incurred by general agents acting within the

scope of their authority all the members may be fairly
sumed to have authorized or ratified such acts.
society either b-' rule or custom allows its
vants to incur debts,

pre-

Thus if the

officials or ser-

then all the members are personally

liable and the more certain is this liability if the organization is

habitually conducted on a credt

1T'inciple.

But

in the case of a special agent, or of a general agent exceeding the scope of I is

usual line of duty, only those menrers

are individually liable
or ratified his acts;

who can be shown to have authorized
es1ecially if the society works on a

cash basis, the mere fact of membership will not make one
personally liable for its debts unless he can be shown to
have advised , sanctioned, or ratified the transaction.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FRATERNITY INCORPORATED.

In

States like 7le

York where special statutes ex-

iEt tnder which organizations like college fraternities can
conveniently become incorporatedmany such societies, especially if they oin real estate for society purposes, take advantage of the statutory privilege.

lany benefits accruo to

a fraternity incorporated under the New York Statutes which
are not possessed by one hot incorporated,.

In the former,

personal liCbility is to a considerable extent eliminated;
stock or bonds may be issued and this frequently facilitates
the purchase of real estate for society purposes;

the powers

and liabilities of the incorporated society are more clearly
defined and being a child of the state, the watchful eye of
its stern parent furnishes a greater inducement for it to

travel the path of financial rectitude.
In New York, there are txvo laws under which clubs, societies, or associations, may be incorporated, one passed on

130the 11th. of April, 1865, the other on the 12th. of MIay,

1875.

These laws which at first sight seem to be so much alike differ in some important particulars.

The act of 1875, covers

a greater variety of objects than the act of 1865.

It will

largely depend therefore, upon the object aid purposes for
which the club or society is organized whether it should be
incorporated under the former or under the latter act.
It is sufficient for us to note that the college fraterThe numfer of trust-

nity may be incorporated under either.

ees under the act of 1865, cannot exceed thirteen and cannot
be less than three;

under the act of 1875, there cannot be

more than twenty nor less than five.

Per~;onal liability

for corporate debts under Section eight of the act of 1865,
extends only to trustees; it. the act of l75, the additional
words "directors aid managers" are used.
t1-V

Section seven of

act of 1805, declarez that such liability shall extend

to debts payable "within" one year from the tine they shall
have been contracted.
act of 1875,
omitted .

is

The language of section eight of the

thB same except that tle

word "within" is

"teresult of this omission nay operate to relieve

1--

the trustees of a society,incor--c-ated under the act of 1875.
from personal liability
any time

in cases where debts are payable at

"within" one yearthough it is uncertain what con-

struction would be given to this larguagc by the courts.
By chapter 380 of the laws o. 1877, Corporations fored
under the act of 18C5,

were given power to issue stock or

bonds or either to an amount equal to the value of their real
estate and the act cf 1865 with thi8amendmrent seems to offer
the greater advantagesto societies o,,ning or contemplating
the purchase of real estate upon which an indebtedness shall
exist.

By chapter 68 of the laws of 1884,

it

was provided

that societies incorporatd under either of jhe above acts may
mortgage their real or personal estate upon applyin,, for and.
obtaining an order from the Supreme Court granting permission
to execute such nortgage and the granting of this permission
is
ti-n

r'de

discretionary with the court.

( The above acts and

anendnents to then can be found in Banks & Bro's Edition

of N.Y.PEv.Stat., Vol. Iii.

pp. 2021-2027.)

There is little if any difference between incorporated
and tnincorporated societies in respect to the rules of law

-72relating to expulsion and to the contractual relation between
the society and its :'eoffuers.

But in the matter of the indi-

vidual liability of rarbers for debts of the-. -ociety there is
a well defined distinction sinco by t]-)
bility

common law, this lia-

did not attach to the member of a corporation,

and h

hence they are not liable unlecs made so by the legislature.
As we have already noticedin the Xind of corporations we are
considering personal liability only extends to the trustees
and is limited to certain classes of debts.
A society may be incorporated under the act of 1865, by
filing and recording it in the office of the ;Secretary of
State and in the County in which the office of such society
is situated a certificate in writing signed by five or more
persons of full age, citizens of the United Statera majority
of whom shall be also citizens of this State;

in which cer-

tificate shall be stated the name or title by which such society shall be known in law, the particular object or business
of such society, the number of trustees , directors, or mana-

gers tc ranage the same an& the nLanc of the trustees , directors or managers for the first year of its existanco1 but such

certificate shall not be filed unless by the written consent
and approbation of one of the justiccr

of the Suprome Court

of the district in which the principal office of such society
shall be located, to be endorsed on such certificate. (A form
of this certificate is given in the Appendix).

The certifi-

cate must be acknowledged like a deed or any other instrument
which is to be recorded.

Although the consent of a justice

of the Supreme Court is one of the conditions precedent to
the right of filing, it decidee nothing and does not preclude
the Secretary of State from passin- upon the question as to
whetherithe certificate wastauthorized by statute as he is
not bound to file a certificate which the statute does not r
authorize.
The'act of 1865 specified the amount limit of real and
personal estate which may be owned by a society incorporated
thereutnder, fixing the maximum value of real estate at

$500000,

r

and of personal estate at $150,000; the powers and

duties of trustees and directors;

how the numrer may be in-

creased and diminished; bow the certificate of incorporation
may be amended.

It also provides that it shall be the duty

3 4of the trustees or a majority of them in the month of December of each year

to '°ake and file in the County Clerk's

office where the original certificate is filed, a certificate
under their hands stating the nrmes of' the trustees and officors of the corporation, with an inventory of the property
effects, and liabilities thereof, together with an affidavit
of the truth of such certificate and inventory.

As this

provision of the act is frequently not complied with, it may
be well to note that in accordance with the rules of law affecting do facto corporations, a regularly organized corporation vhich has duly observed the formalities of the law in
its inception man be called to account only by the State for
a subsequent failure to comply .,.
7ith the requirements of the
statute under which it was created;therefore an omission to
file the above mentioned certificate and affidavit while giving ground for the Attorney General to proceed to dissolve
the nogligont or disobedient corporation,

yet cannot be taken

advantage of by any private individual and can in
aft

no way

ct or change the (,xemption of a member from individual

liability for society debts.
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The revision of the statutes of 'New York which is now
being accomplished will include the laws providing for the
incorporation of societies similar to that which forms part of
our subject, and it is probable that after the next session
of the legislature
will

,

societies contemplating incorporation

find an act which will have moro comrendable features

than those now on our Statute books.

APPENDIX .

Form of' Certificate under Chapter Ze8 of the Laws of 1865.
---

0---

CERTIFICATEt CF INCORPORATIo
0OF
THE ALPHA ALPHA CHAPTER OF THE BETA BETA FRATERNITY

We, A.,

1.,

C.,

D., E., F.,

and G. of the city of

Ithaca, County of Tompkins, State of New York, desiring to
form a society in pursuance of Chapter .G8 of the Laws of
8

entitled "An act for the Incorporation of Societies or

Clubs for certain Social and Recreative Purposes", and of the
several acts extending or amending the same, do hereby certify

i.

That all of the incorporators herein named are of

full age and citizens of the United States, and a majority of
them are citizons of the State of New York.

II.

That the name of such society shall be "The Alpha

-2Alpha Chapter of the Beta Beta Fraternity".

III.

That the object of such society is the social inter-

course and the cultivation of feelings of brotherhood and
good fellowship between its members.

IV_

That the number of Trustees to ranage the affairs

and property of the corporation shall be five.

V.

That the name of the Trustees for the first year

are
A.--------

D3,-------C.-------D.---------

E.---------

VI.

That the obr±ter house of such society is situated

in the City of Ithaca, County of Tompkins, State of New York.

IN WITNESS W1MREOF we have hereunto set our hands this
-day of------1894.
A.-------B.--------

I----------

C.--------

State of New York:
SS.

County of Tompkins:
On this

personally apDeared A.,
known,

13.,

----

C.,

day of

D.,

E.,

1894,

----

,

F.,

and G.,

before me

to me

and know-n to me to be the individuals described in

and

who executed the foregoing certificate and they severally
acknowlodged to me that they executed the same .
John Smith
(seal)

Notary Pufblic.

